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THE DUTIES AND RISKS OF THE
DUTY-RISK ANALYSIS
Timothy J. McNamara*
Approximately a quarter of a century ago the writer was introduced
to the theory and methodology of the duty-risk analysis (and indeed the
entire corpus of the law of tort) by the man in whose honor this sym-
posium has been collected and organized. At that time the analysis was
an elegant but arcane theoretical construct thought suitable and useful
to academicians in the training of young legal minds. But the seed took
root, flourished and spread with the energy and impetus of an idea whose
time had come. Today, it can be said without exaggeration that one of
the prime movers of tort law in Louisiana is the methodology of the duty-
risk analysis, as first espoused by Green' and then refined, honed, and
proselytized by Malone, not only by his numerous influential articles listed
elsewhere in this symposium' but more importantly by his years of lec-
tures to so many students, now members of both bench and bar.
The purpose of this article is to outline briefly the historical origins
of the duty-risk analysis methodology, define its parameters, and trace
its development through the jurisprudence of Louisiana over the years.
In so doing, the article notes some of the rather deft and imaginative
applications of the analysis by the judiciary as it became more familiar
with the methodology through repeated application and hence more aware
of its inherent versatility. Then, from the admittedly limited view of the
practitioner of the law of torts as opposed to that of a jurist or a legal
scholar, the writer suggests answers to problems regarding the future
development and utilization of the duty-risk analysis, the duties it im-
poses intellectually, and the risks attending its application.
THE DUTY-RISK ANALYSIS: ITS ORIGIN AND ELEMENTS
When Oliver Wendell Holmes proclaimed in his usual Jovian manner
that "the life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience, '
he sounded the rallying cry of the movement toward judicial realism that
blossomed, in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part
of the twentieth century in this country. The methodology of the duty-
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risk analysis is nothing more nor less than the pragmatic progeny of that
judicial philosophy. It is the tool by which a philosophical ideal, judicial
realism, is implemented in the court room and case law.
One can not judge the efficacy of this methodology as a jurispruden-
tial tool without recalling the condition which it corrected. Because of
the complexities of human existence, only a small fraction of human con-
duct can be regulated by public law (either civil or criminal) or by the
private law of contract. The majority of human activity is thus relegated
to regulation via the law of tort. The basis of any such body of law,
which must be broad enough to encompass the almost infinite variety and
complexity of human conduct, can not give any specific guidance for a
given situation. The common law jurisprudence developed the "reasonable
man," against whose conduct all others are measured. In Louisiana, Civil
Code articles 2315 and 2316" provide the general standard for judging
conduct, absent any positive public law or private contract.
Lacking any useful guidelines or parameter, the law of tort would
necessarily have to be generated on a step-by-step, case-by-case basis.
However, due to various considerations ranging from the theological or
philisophical to perhaps even political,5 the courts in both Louisiana and
common law jurisdictions solved this problem by avoiding their true func-
tion in enforcing the law of tort. By a rather clever feat of legal legerde-
main, the courts simply converted a question of law into a question of
fact and shifted the responsibility of decision onto the shoulders of the
jury. They accomplished this result by developing the doctrine of prox-
imate cause. After instructing the twelve lay jurors that every person is
responsible for the damages he occasions, not merely by his act but by
his negligence, imprudence or want of skill (in Louisiana), 6 or that an
individual is liable for the damages he occasions to his neighbor due to
his negligence, i.e., failure to act as a reasonable man (in common law
jurisdictions), the court then would further enlighten the members of the
jury by telling them that the conduct of the defendant must be the "pro-
ximate cause" of the plaintiff's injury. Judicial definitions of the term
4. Civil Code article 2315 provides in part: "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." Article 2316 pro-
vides: "Every person is responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his act,
but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill." Only the congenitally gullible
(the analogue of David Robertson's charming character in Robertson, Reason Versus Rule
in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. REV.
1, 4 (1973)) would accept the proposition that these two articles in and of themselves are
words to live by to avoid running afoul of the law of torts in Louisiana.
5. L. GREEN, supra note 1; Campbell, Duty, Fault, and Legal Cause, 1938 Wis. L.
REV. 402; Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 Ill. L. REV. 645 (1932); Lewis, Proximate
Cause in Law, 7 FLA. B.J. 109 (1933). All of these articles at one point or another speculate
on the perversity of courts in disguising what their true function was.
6. LA. Crv. CODE arts. 2315 & 2316, quoted supra note 4.
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proximate cause have ranged in variety from the sublime to the ridiculous.'
For example, the court might give the jury positive guidance about just
what constitutes the proximate cause of an injury in tort law by stating:
" 'Proximate cause' " means that not only must the negligent act or omis-
sion played [sic] a substantial part in bringing about or actually. causing
the injury or damage, but also that the injury or damage was either a
direct result or a reasonable probable consequence of the act or omission." 8
With such edifying comments and directions, the jury would be dismissed
to the jury room for deliberations. The court could then sit back and
await the jury's verdict. If that verdict pleased both the district judge
and appellate reviewing court, then the jury's decision would stand. After
enough similar decisions were rendered and allowed to stand on appeal,
a "precedent" would evolve. Juries then could be instructed on the specific
conduct prohibited by the prior case law. All of this precedent developed
without the touch of an identifiable judicial hand or any given probative
reason as to why that particular species of conduct by that type of defen-
dant would now and forever more be penalized. Of course, on the other
hand, if a decision was not to the court's liking at either the district or
the appellate level, the judiciary was not without its own resources to
"correct" the jury's errors. Professor Green exposed and denounced this
practice as early as 1927 in his amazing work, The Rationale of Prox-
imate Cause. Discussing the then prevalent practice of courts employing
the concept of proximate cause whenever they faced a case for decision
without precedent, he forthrightly declared:
By reason of this complex process in such cases and by reason
of the surface similarities between the judge's primary function
and that of the jury, confusion is easily developed. Judges
habitually fall into two grave errors in handling cases of this
nature. First, they do not recognize that they have a function to
perform by way of defining the limits of the rule involved. Sec-
ond, they place the burden on the jury under the guise of deter-
mining "proximate cause." And the stupid part of it all is that
the attempt is made to use the "probability of harm" formula,
employed to determine negligence, also as a test of this so-called
"proximate cause" issue. Frequently a third error is made. It hap-
pens in this way: If the result obtained from erroneously leaving
the fictitious "cause" issue to the jury is palpably unjust, or if
the result of leaving it to the jury would probably be so, the ap-
pellate court declares as a matter of law that there was in fact
no causal relation issue to be left to the jury, and proceeds to
7. For an excellent discussion of the various definitions promulgated at various times
or for different circumstances by courts in Louisiana, see Comment, Proximate Cause in
Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REv. 391 (1956).
8. Brody v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 438 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir. 1971).
1984] 1229
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
deal with it as an issue of causation for the court. Here they make
use of all those weighted phrases as "remote,' ''unforeseen, "
"intervening agencies," "independent agencies," and a score of
others which are meaningless as solvents except they provide a
smoke screen behind which the court can retire from an awkward
position. They do here under the guise of determining "proximate
cause" what should have been done by way of defining the scope
of protection afforded by the rule invoked.
.. .All in all this confused method of dealing with the prob-
lem, though widely accepted is a wretched one, inexcusably
perpetuated by intelligent judges and utterly devoid of scientific
foundation. The law cannot progress in this broad and increas-
ingly important field, the negligence concept cannot be developed
to include its legitimate territory, until this error is eradicated root
and branch.9
As so aptly observed by Professor Malone, "the phrases of proximate
cause are little more than gaudy ribbons with which the package of liability
may be decorated once its contents have already been fixed by the court
through resort to some other mystique."'" The antidote conceived by
Green" and refined by Malone" was the duty-risk analysis.
THE METHODOLOGY OF A DUTY-RISK ANALYSIS
The first and most important thing to understand about the
methodology of a duty-risk analysis is what it does not encompass. The
duty-risk inquiry completely divorces the factual question of causation
from the process of fixing the legal responsibility for the act. As Green
put it:
Also it is well to understand that it is not important to the
causal relation issue that defendant's conduct in whole or in part
was lawful, unlawful, intentional, unintentional, negligent, or non-
negligent. The moment some moral consideration is introduced
into the inquiry the issue is no longer one of causal relation.
Causal relation is a neutral issue, blind to right and wrong."
9. L. GREEN, supra note 1, at 76-77.
10. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American Beverage Com-
pany, 30 LA. L. REV. 363, 364 (1970).
11. L. GREEN, supra note 1; L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); L. GREEN, THE LInGA-
TION PROCESS IN TORT LAW: No PLACE TO STOP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TORT LAW (2d
ed. 1977).
12. See, e.g., Malone, supra note 10; Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN.
L. REV. 10 (1956).
13. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 549
(1962) (emphasis added).
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As Professor Crowe observed:' 4
Green's strength is that he has split the atom of "proximate cause"
which has so plagued effective legal thinking for many years. The
very term "proximate cause" connotes simultaneous inquiries of
factual causation, on the one hand, and morality, culpability, or
responsibility on the other hand. One must solve the questions
of factual causation first, without any of the entanglements of
morality, culpability, or responsibility. Then and only then,
without any of the entanglements of factual causation, can the
problems of morality, culpability, or responsibility be resolved.'"
Embellishing and elucidating upon Green's isolation of the causation issue
as one of fact, Professor Malone wrote:
The determination of cause-in-fact is launched by fixing as
precisely as possible the piece of conduct-the exact act or
omission-with which the defendant is charged. This item of
behavior must be regarded as a cause-in-fact of the harm suf-
fered by the victim whenever the trier concludes that the same
harm would probably not have occurred if the defendant had not
engaged in the conduct with which he is charged. A cause-in-fact
can thus be defined as a necessary antecedent, and the process
of determining the existence or non-existence of cause is essen-
tially one in which the trier speculates as to what would have
happened if the conduct in question had not taken place. Since
this assumed state of affairs represents a negation of the situa-
tion as it actually existed, we can only engage in surmise. The
permissible degrees of likelihood are many, and our conjecture
may lead us to conclude that the same harmful consequence would
have come into being as a certainty, a probability, or a possibil-
ity, even if defendant had behaved otherwise than as he actually
did behave. It is at this point that the usual and accepted re-
quirement that facts be established by probabilities comes into
play. If the victim would probably not have encountered the harm
but for the defendant's conduct, it can be concluded that such
conduct was a cause in fact and that the victim has sustained
the required burden of proof on that issue.'"
A word of caution is appropriate at this point. A careful reading of
the writings of Green and Malone quoted above reveals that the purpose
14. William L. Crowe, Sr. is a Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law,
New Orleans, Louisiana; a former Chairman, Tort Compensation Section, Association of
American Law Schools; and a former student of Wex Malone.
15. Crowe, The Anatomy of a Tort-Greenian, as Interpreted by Crowe Who Has
Been Influenced by Malone-a Primer, 22 Loy. L. REV. 903, 904 (1976).
16. Malone, supra note 10, at 370.
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of the exercise is to determine whether a described piece of conduct of
the defendant more probably than not contributed to the plaintiff's
harm-nothing more and nothing less. All lawyers are familiar with such
concepts as last clear chance, intervening negligence, active and passive
negligence and, of course, proximate cause. In considering causation, one
must always guard against the subliminal pull of these arcane doctrines
which, when coupled with the understandable desire for certainty, com-
bine to complicate the solution of an otherwise relatively simple problem.
It is heartening to note that the Louisiana Supreme Court appears to have
a firm grasp not only of the limited scope of the cause-in-fact inquiry
but also of when that inquiry should be conducted in the course of ad-
judicating the controversy. In Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American
Beverage Co.," the supreme court boldly stated that negligent conduct
need only be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm
in order to qualify as a cause in fact.' 8 In another case decided shortly
after Dixie Drive It Yourself, the court further explained its conception
of cause in fact:
It is fundamental that negligence is not actionable unless it is
a cause in fact of the harm for which recovery is sought. It need
not, of course, be the sole cause. Negligence is a cause in fact
of a harm to another if it was a substantial factor in bringing
about that harm. Under the circumstances of the instant case,
the excessive speed was undoubtedly a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the collision if the collision would not have occurred
without it. On the other hand, if the collision would have occur-
red irrespective of such negligence, then it was not a substantial
factor. '9
The supreme court seems well aware that the order of business in ad-
judicating a tort controversy is to resolve the cause-in-fact issue before
attacking the meatier and usually more complicated issue of fixing legal
responsibility.2" If the plaintiff fails to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that more probably than not the defendant's conduct was a cause-
in-fact of the plaintiff's harm, that is the end of the inquiry.
As .a practical matter, the plaintiff's case will seldom fail to pass
muster on the issue of causation if the litigation progresses to trial on
the merits, particularly where the trier of fact is a jury. In the real world
17. 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962).
18. 242 La. at 482, 137 So. 2d at 302.
19. Perkins v. Texas & N.O. R.R., 243 La. 829, 835, 147 So. 2d 646, 648 (1962) (foot-
notes omitted). See also Hill v. Lundin Assocs., Inc., 260 La. 542, 547, 256 So. 2d 620,
622 (1972) (stating that to the extent the defendant's act had something to do with the
harm sustained by the plaintiff, it met the test of a factual, causal relationship).
20. Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., Inc., 260 La. 542, 547, 256 So. 2d 620, 622 (1972);
Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257 La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821 (1970).
1232 [Vol. 44
WEX MALONE TORTS SYMPOSIUM
of litigation, claims with a weak factual basis seldom progress even to
the point of filing of suit, much less to the stage of trial on the merits.
In such cases, the merits or lack thereof are quickly perceived by counsel
for plaintiff and disposed of expeditiously by either a nominal settlement
or a refusal to undertake the case.
DUTY-RISK ANALYSIS
In his customarily lucid and penetrating manner, Professor Green
wrote: "Phrased in terms of requisites, a tort comprehends: (1) An in-
terest protected, (2) against the particular hazard encountered, (3) by some
rule of law, (4) which the defendant's conduct violated, (5) thereby caus-
ing, (6) damages to the plaintiff."'" In the methodology of duty-risk, req-
uisite five is the issue addressed first in the analysis of any alleged tort
and is disposed of independently via the cause-in-fact determination
discussed above. The absence of one of these requisites destroys the prop-
osition that any tort occurred; thus, as discussed previously, the absence
of a cause-in-fact relationship between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's
alleged damages ends the inquiry. Requisite six, obviously a pure fact ques-
tion, is beyond the scope of this article. Thus, four elements necessary
for the imposition of tort liability are still to be considered.
To borrow and expand upon Professor Crowe's analogy, the elegance
of the methodology of duty-risk is that it splits the atom not once but
twice. It first isolates for step one requisite five, causation in fact. Then
it again divides the analytical procedure by separating requisite four, that
the particular defendant was guilty of substandard conduct, from step
three of the methodology. Thus, only requisites one through three are
considered at the second stage of the analytical procedure. These three
requisites thus isolated present a pure question of law: Does a rule of
law protect the interest of this plaintiff against the particular hazard en-
countered? How the whole process came to be known by the rubric "duty-
risk analysis" is apparent; stated in the sparest terms, the issue is whether
the defendant owes a legal duty to the plaintiff and, if so, whether the
duty extends to the particular risk encountered by this particular plaintiff.
Fortunately, renowned legal writers 2 have identified the factors which
courts should consider when making the duty-risk determination. The
general consensus is that six identifiable socioeconomic considerations in-
fluence the decision of whether the defendant owed a legal duty to a par-
ticular plaintiff not to create this specific risk of harm by the precise con-
duct which the court has already concluded was a cause in fact of the
21. L. GREEN, supra note 1, at 3-4.
22. See L. GREEN, supra note 1; Crowe, supra note 15; Johnson, Comparative Negligence
and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 LA. L. REv. 319 (1980); Malone, supra note 10; Robertson,
supra note 4; Comment, supra note 7.
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plaintiff's injuries. Obviously, there is interplay among these factors as
the judge ponders his decision. As a practitioner, the writer wishes that
every judge would tape these six considerations to his wrist like a quarter-
back so that, when he has a visceral feeling as to who should win, he
can at least check off each of these elements to determine exactly why
he approves the position of one side or another and. at the same time
make sure he has not overlooked an important consideration. These six
factors are: (1) ease of association, (2) administrative considerations, (3)
economic considerations, (4) moral considerations, (5) type of activity,
and (6) precedent or historical considerations. 3 For purposes of com-
pleteness only, a brief discussion of each of these elements or factors is
in order.
First and foremost and, in the writer's opinion as a practitioner, most
effective is ease of association: Is the harm which befell the plaintiff easily
associated with the type of conduct engaged in by the defendant? Ob-
viously, foreseeability plays a part in this determination in the sense that,
whenever the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff is a predictable con-
sequence of the conduct of the defendant if things go awry, then the term
foreseeable is applicable. However, one should not confuse the foreseeabil-
ity of harm by this defendant to this plaintiff (which is a specific factual
question) with the ease of association factor. Foresceability in the ease
of association factor is a question of law which asks whether the injury
is easily associated with the activity, not whether the defendant should
have foreseen the plaintiff's injury. In short, it is necessary to divorce
the defendant in his particular circumstances from the actual conduct he
engaged in. It is the association of the conduct with the harm that is
relevant, rather than that of the defendant with the harm.
The administrative factor is simply a policy decision by the court as
to whether imposition of a duty on this defendant would result in a
plethora of time-consuming and costly litigation just to make one plain-
tiff whole. The extreme caution and restrictive attitude of the courts with
respect to who can bring a claim for mental distress for injury to another
is one example of the potency of this element.
The economic factor speaks for itself. However, again it sfiould be
cautioned that this factor is not merely an inquiry of who has the deepest
pocket in this particular case, no matter how elegantly one may state the
proposition. The adjudicator must avoid allowing a factual determination
of who of the litigants before him is best able to bear the loss to answer
the economic factor inquiry. To do otherwise is to permit the factual con-
23. It is submitted that if you add the following seventh element, Green's definition
becomes a thumbnail description of all the elements of a tort lawsuit: (7) Is there a valid
defense in fact or law available to the defendant which will either bar plaintiff's claim or
mitigate his damages?
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siderations of this particular case to creep into the policy decision. The
economic factor should be a determination of which litigant can best ef-
fectively distribute the loss, considering the impact of not imposing the
legal duty on the defendant on plaintiffs similarly situated, and the im-
pact of a decision in favor of the plaintiff, not only on the defendant,
but on all parties of the same class and the consequent impact on the
industry, community, and perhaps the economies of the state and nation.
The moral factor is just that. In the experience of this practitioner,
judges, like juries, are on the lookout for the guy with the black hat.
Woe betide the wearer, be he plaintiff or defendant, if the court can find
a way to prevent him from using the judicial process to further his
nefarious ends.
The type of activity factor is somewhat akin to the moral factor. When
the type of activity engaged in by the defendant is of little or no social
consequence and particularly when it is reprehensible, the court tends to
cast a baleful eye in the defendant's direction. Similarly, some activities
are so fraught with danger of injuries to others that the court decides
that liability should be imposed whenever a defendant engaged in such
an activity does in fact cause provable damage to a plaintiff. Examples
of such activities are pile driving and blasting.
Finally, there is the historical or precedent factor. The obvious exam-
ple is the citation of a large number of cases which are similar in reason-
ing to the proposition before the court. When this factor comes into play,
however, the court, while often looking to the past and present for
guidance, can also look into the future. Like Janus it should look in both
directions. For instance, have conditions in society so changed that the
precedent set in another day in another context is no longer valid? Do
the later cases indicate a trend away from the rule relied upon by one
side or the other and towards a new rule of law regarding the conduct
in question? What precedent will the adjudicator set by deciding in favor
of one or the other litigants with regard to future litigation? These con-
siderations are all part of the historical or precedent factor in rule-making.
At this point, it may be well for the reader to pause and get his bear-
ings. Referring back to the six requisites of a tort, recall that step one
of the methodology, the cause-in-fact determination, disposes of requisite
5. Step two of the methodology, the application of the duty-risk analysis
in order to determine a pure question of law, disposes of requisites one,
two, and three. Pretermitting the obvious factual issue encompassed in
requisite six, the damages to the plaintiff, only requisite four-that the
defendant's conduct was indeed tortious-remains to be disposed of by
step three of the methodology. In strict liability cases this fourth requisite
is simply skipped over. The adjudicator moves on to the question of the
defendant's possible defenses, victim fault, fault of a third party, and
irresistible force, and then on to damages if necessary. Likewise, in cases
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of intentional tort, this step of the methodology is a given in almost all
instances. However, in most tort cases, grounded as they are in negligence,
the third step of the methodology is indeed needed.
In this step of the duty-risk methodology, the factual issue is whether
or not this particular defendant acted unreasonably. To the thoughtful
this is obviously not as clear a fact question as the determination of cause
in fact,2" for it brings into play for the trier of fact in almost all cases
the doctrine of the mythical "reasonable" man. The trier of fact draws
upon past experience, common sense, and any other subjective experience
and knowledge to create a standard of conduct which the reasonable man,
as constructed by this trier of fact, would have adhered to. He then reviews
the evidence to see whether the actual defendant at bar measures up.
However, in jury cases the trier of fact should be given more concrete
guidelines than the mythical reasonable man standard. The writers in this
field have identified the prime elements for consideration by the trier of
fact: (1) the likelihood of the harm, (2) the gravity of the harm, (3) the
burden of prevention, and (4) the social utility of the defendant's conduct.
Based on years of practice, the writer has found that there seldom
is serious controversy over the existence of four of the six requisites for
a tort described by Green. Usually the fight centers on requisite four,
whether the defendant violated his duty to the plaintiff, or requisite six,
the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff, not to mention a seventh
element, the validity of the defendant's defenses. It has been the writer's
experience that both bench and bar could use their time profitably in ap-
plying to every case the methodology of the duty-risk analysis with its
three-step process. Use of this analysis may reveal the presence or absence
of a requisite which has been hidden behind a controversy regarding other
requisites.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE
The Appendix to this article contains over two hundred cases from
the appellate courts of Louisiana from around 1962 to date in which the
courts with varying degrees of success and expertise employed the
methodology of duty-risk rather than the doctrine of proximate cause.
Commencing in 1962 with the benchmark case, Dixie Drive It Yourself,"5
the trickle of opinions in tort cases employing this methodology turned
into a flood as the judiciary became more familiar with this bold new
concept. Because of its inherent flexibility, the duty-risk methodology has
virtually supplanted the doctrine of proximate cause as the prime decision-
24. For purposes of this article, the writer will forego the nice underlying issue that
determination of cause in fact begins with a selection between competing philosophies of
what is cause and what is effect.
25. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.
2d 298 (1962).
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making tool employed by this state's judiciary in the field of tort law.
Over the years, the writer has closely observed this development with the
eye of the practitioner, as opposed to the sharper, more penetrating gaze
of the legal academician. Time, space and native ability prohibit a discourse
on every case significantly contributing to the growth and development
of the duty-risk analysis in Louisiana jurisprudence. What is attempted
here is an analysis of those cases which struck the writer as significant
from the standpoint of the practitioner. To those who may quarrel with
the inclusion or exclusion of certain cases, the reply is that the chosen
cases are those considered by the writer and other practitioners to be most
significant to the growth and development of the duty-risk analysis in
the jurisprudence.
As long ago as 1927, Professor Green puzzled over the paradox that
whenever the plaintiff relied on a statute as the rule of law, the courts
were quite open to considering innumerable factors in deciding whether
the statute was designed to protect against the hazard encountered by the
plaintiff due to the defendant's conduct. Yet, when faced with a case
based upon a non-statutory or common law rule, candor and clarity disap-
peared within the shell of proximate cause.26 It is therefore unsurprising
and indeed quite proper that in the landmark decision, Dixie Drive It
Yourself, the supreme court, in first applying this methodology, cautiously
selected a case involving a statute which clearly defined proscribed con-
duct, leaving open only the question of whether the plaintiff's interest
was protected against the particular hazard encountered.27
In Dixie Drive It Yourself, an American Beverage Company truck
became disabled on the main travel portions of the highway. In contraven-
tion of Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:369,28 requiring a display of red
signal flags for a vehicle stopped on the travel portions of a highway,
American Beverage's driver simply did not put them out. The lessee of
plaintiff's truck negligently failed to observe the defendant's vehicle, with
the resultant damage to the plaintiff-lessor's truck. One gathers from an
analysis of the opinion that the main impetus behind the supreme court's
reversal of the lower court's judgment dismissing the claim of Dixie on
the grounds that the defendant's negligence was "passive" was to put
an end to a game of juridical musical chairs that had developed in the
lower courts. As Justice Sanders remarked of the lower court's employ-
ment of the doctrine of proximate cause and intervening negligence as
a means of dismissing the plaintiff's claim, "[t]he thrust of this formula-
tion of law is toward relieving all but the last wrongdoer of liability to
an innocent victim in torts involving intervening negligence." 29
26. L. GREEN, supra note 1, at 40-41.
27. Id. at 3.
28. (1963).
29. 242 La. at 488, 137 So. 2d at 304.
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Justice Sanders quickly disposed of requisites three and four by find-
ing the statute to be the rule of law and finding as a matter of fact that
defendant's employee violated that statute by remaining in the truck and
failing to display the red signal flags. Utilizing the methodology of duty-
risk, he quickly isolated the real controversies as being centered on re-
quisite five (cause in fact) and requisites one and two (whether the plain-
tiff's interest was protected against the particular hazard encountered).
"In the instant case it bifurcates into two distinct inquiries: whether the
negligence of the obstructing driver was a cause-in-fact of the collision;
and whether the defendants should be relieved of liability because of the
intervening negligence of the driver of the Dixie truck." 3 Then, proceeding
exactly in the fashion prescribed by the methodology, he began with step
one and disposed of the cause-in-fact problem. "It is clear that more than
one legally responsible cause can, and frequently does, contribute to a
vehicular collision. Negligent conduct is a cause-in-fact of harm to another
if it was a substantial factor in bringing about that harm." 3 Further on
in the opinion Justice Sanders remarked:
We can reasonably infer that the collision would not have occur-
red if the statutory precautions to protect approaching traffic had
been taken. The mere possibility that the accident would have
occurred despite the required precautions does not break the chain
of causation.
We conclude that the negligence of the obstructing driver was
a substantial factor in bringing about the collision, or a
cause-in-fact.32
Having thus found requisite five to be present, and since requisites three
and four were a given (defendant's conduct was clearly substandard and
in violation of the statute), he then proceeded to step two, the applica-
tion of a duty-risk analysis. All he was seeking to assertain was whether
requisites one and two were present.
The essence of the present inquiry is whether the risk and harm
encountered by the plaintiff fall within the scope of the protec-
tion of the statute. It is a hazard problem. Specifically, it involves
a determination of whether the statutory duty of displaying signal
flags and responsibility for protecting traffic were designed, at
least in part, to afford protection to the class of claimants of
which plaintiff is a member from the hazard of confused or inat-
tentive drivers colliding with stationary vehicles on the highway. 3
30. 242 La. at 481-82, 137 So. 2d at 302.
31. 242 La. at 482, 137 So. 2d at 302.
32. 242 La. at 487, 137 So. 2d at 304.
33. 242 La. at 488, 137 So. 2d at 304.
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The court cited Maggiore v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Service,3" an older
opinion written by a very good judge, Judge Janvier. It is submitted that
in Dixie Drive It Yourself, the factor which carried the day for the plain-
tiff was the historical or precedent factor. After citing the Maggiore case,
as well as others, plus an excellent law review article,3" Justice Sanders
concluded:
The. objective of the statutory provisions violated in the instant
case was to protect against the likelihood that an oncoming
motorist, whether cautious, confused or inattentive, would fail
to timely perceive the vehicle or that it was stationary and become
involved in an accident. The law was designed to protect the plain-
tiff (and any member of its class) against such an accident as
occurred in this case.36
To his everlasting credit, not only did Justice Sanders employ the
methodology of the duty-risk analysis precisely as it was intended to be
applied, but he also went one step further and openly criticized the doc-
trine of proximate cause and pinpointed its weakness and failures. "As
employed by courts, proximate cause is a legal concept without fixed con-
tent. It is used indiscriminately to refer to cause-in-fact, the scope of liabil-
ity, and other negligence factors." 37 Justice Sanders perceived exactly what
has been suggested: The doctrine of proximate cause is a factual deter-
mination inside a legal determination disguised in another factual
determination."
Three years after Dixie Drive It Yourself, the third circuit made a
quantum leap towards the adoption of the duty-risk analysis when it
decided Dartez v. City of Sulphur,39 as elegant an application of this
methodology as has been written before or since. Dartez was a suit by
a pedestrian against a municipality to recover on the basis of a hazardous
sidewalk defect for personal (very personal) injuries sustained when he
fell across a bent parking meter post after first tripping ( -er a piece of
baling wire on the sidewalk. Following the methodology perfectly, Judge
Tate disposed of the cause-in-fact problem by stating that the bent park-
ing meter post was undoubtedly a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries
because it, along with the baling wire, was a substantial factor in produc-
ing them. Having disposed of that issue by step one of the process, he
then moved to step two. Applying the duty-risk analysis, he quickly deter-
34. 50 So. 394 (La. App. Orl. 1933).
35. Comment, supra note 7.
36. 242 La. at 492, 137 So. 2d at 307.
37. 242 La. at 494-95, 137 So. 2d at 307.
38. For a more penetrating analysis of this case, see Malone, supra note 10.
39. 179 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 3d Cir.1965).
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mined that there was no serious controversy with regard to requisites one
and three. Citing jurisprudence to support his position (again the historical
or precedent factor), Judge Tate found that the city was under a duty
to maintain its sidewalk free of trap-like hazards. In doing so he stated:
"The purpose of the duty thus is to prevent injuries to pedestrians who
might fall over this knee-high obstacle in their path if unable reasonably
to observe or appreciate the hazard so created." ' But, utilizing the duty-
risk analysis, Judge Tate identified the fatal flaw in the plaintiff's case,
the absence of requisite two, by stating:
[T]he duty to remove the bent post from travel lanes existed in
order to prevent injury to those who might proceed into it unaware
of its existence; not to prevent injury to those who fully aware
of it might nevertheless happen to fall upon it.
That is, the plaintiff's injuries resulted because when he fell
the bent post happened to be in his way. The duty imposed upon
the city not to obstruct the walkway by the bent pole did not
include within its scope the protection of those who might need
the space occupied by the bent pole in order to fall free of it
and thus to hit the sidewalk instead . . .
To put it another way, Judge Tate found that the plaintiff's interest was
not protected against the particular hazard encountered. Thus, although
the defendant's conduct violated a rule of law against municipalities main-
taining hazardous sidewalks, a rule which was designed to protect the in-
terest of pedestrians such as the plaintiff, the court found that the rule
was not designed to protect against the particular hazard encountered by
this particular pedestrian. Not until 1972 did another opinion so expertly
use the methodology of the duty-risk analysis to dissect an otherwise poten-
tially confusing case.42
In the writer's opinion, three cases very similar on their facts and
issues, and decided in the span of as many years by the supreme court,
signaled the turning of the tide irrevocably away from the doctrine of
proximate cause and towards the methodology of a duty-risk analysis.
Rowe v. Travelers Insurance Co. 3 is interesting only because of its strik-
ing factual similarity to the other two cases and the manner in which
the supreme court disposed of the issues raised by those facts. In Rowe
the plaintiff's automobile was struck in the rear by a truck. The plain-
tiff's car was parked partially on the highway at night. The left rear cor-
40. Id. at 485.
41. Id.
42. See Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., Inc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972).
43. 253 La. 659, 219 So. 2d 486 (1969).
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ner of the vehicle encroached slightly upon the highway in contravention
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:141'4 which prohibits stopping on a
traveled portion of the road. The court of appeal found that both the
motorist and the truck driver were negligent,4 5 but that the truck driver's
negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. It thus dismissed
the claim of the motorist and awarded judgment against her in favor of
the truck driver and the owner of the truck. The supreme court came
to exactly the opposite conclusion using exactly the same reasoning. Noting
that there was no oncoming traffic, that the truck driver had room to
swerve around the slightly encroaching vehicle, that the lights on the plain-
tiff's vehicle were burning, and that one of plaintiff's passengers attemp-
ted to flag the driver down, but that the truck driver did not observe
plaintiff's vehicle until he was only thirty feet from it, Justice Barham
disposed of the case by using the rubric of proximate cause.
Coe obviously was negligent in failing to observe the lighted,
parked vehicle until he was thirty feet or less from its rear. He
should have observed the lighted car under the circumstances at
a considerable distance, in time to move sufficiently to his left
on the unobstructed portion of the highway and avoid the colli-
sion. Although Mrs. Rowe did not remove her vehicle entirely
off the highway Coe has failed to establish that this constituted
negligence which was a proximate or contributing cause of the
accident. The sole and the proximate cause of this collision was
the failure of Coe to observe what he could and should have
observed. 6
Nowhere does the opinion refer to Dixie Drive It Yourself. At that point,
one could have almost concluded that Dixie Drive It Yourself was a judicial
aberration.
However, approximately a year later the court dramatically steered
a course away from proximate cause and towards the duty-risk
methodology. In Pierre v. Allstate Insurance Co., "7 the plaintiffs' dece-
dent was a guest passenger in a pickup truck which was forced to come
to a stop because the defendant obstructed the roadway by parking his
automobile on it in contravention of the very same statute violated in
Rowe. While waiting for oncoming traffic to clear, the pickup truck was
struck from the rear by a dump truck, causing the plaintiffs' decedent
to be propelled from the passenger compartment and then run over. After
settling with the dump truck driver, the survivors of the decedent sued
the defendant, who had left his unattended vehicle parked partially in
the roadway. The district court dismissed the claim under the doctrine
44. (1963).
45. Rowe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 208 So. 2d 39 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
46. 253 La. at 667-68, 219 So. 2d at 489.
47. 257 La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821 (1970).
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of proximate cause, finding that the dump truck driver's negligence was
the sole proximate cause of the accident. The court of appeal affirmed,
utilizing the same reasoning and holding that the defendant's negligence
in illegally parking the car was too remote to be a cause in fact of the
collision. The supreme court first affirmed the judgment of both lower
courts, again employing the rubric of proximate cause to explain this deci-
sion and citing the Rowe case as precedent. On rehearing, however, the
court reversed itself in a four-three decision, with Justice Barham writing
for the majority. In doing so, the court abandoned the doctrine of prox-
imate cause and switched to the duty-risk methodology. As in Dixie Drive
It Yourself, the court's problem was somewhat simplified because requisite
three, the rule of law, was easily at hand, and there was no question
that requisite four was present since the defendant's conduct clearly
violated that rule of law. Tracking the methodology perfectly, Justice
Barham began with step one, the determination of causation in fact, and
quickly demonstrated that the issue which had confounded both lower
courts, who had dealt with it in terms of proximate cause, was really
no issue at all, since clearly the defendant's obstructing the highway was
a contributing cause in fact of the accident."8 Justice Barham then moved
to step two and quickly dissected the problem as legal, not factual, in
nature by the application of the duty-risk analysis. Referring to the statute
as setting the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, Justice Barham
noted:
The exact risk anticipated by the statutes came into being in this
case because the Chrysler was left in such a position that there
was insufficient room remaining for vehiclar passage on the
highway.
• . . [W]e must decide whether plaintiffs' father was killed
because he was subjected by this act of the defendant's insured
to a risk sought to be avoided by imposition of that duty. 9
The court not only utilized the duty-risk methodology but explained
in a footnote and in a statement in the opinion exactly what it was do-
ing, after finding that Dixie Drive It Yourself was indistinguishable from
the facts of this case.
The keys for the solution of the issue of responsibility when there
48. 257 La. at 491, 242 So. 2d at 828. In one deft stroke Justice Barham displayed
that this was a false issue by noting:
Although it may be said that a vehicle stopped in the position of the pickup
truck for any reason at the time of the accident would have been struck by the
dump truck, the fact is that it was the obstructing Chrysler which caused the
pickup truck to be stopped in a hazardous position, and any hypothetical factual
situation is of no concern here.
257 La. at 490-91, 242 So. 2d at 828.
49. 257 La. at 494-95, 242 So. 2d at 830.
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is more than one cause-in-fact of damages are (1) a determina-
tion of the exact risk or risks anticipated by imposition of the
legal duty which has been breached and (2) the legal or policy
considerations which grant excuses from certain consequences
which follow an act of negligence. This requires, under the facts
and the law of each case and the attendant exigencies a
jurisprudential determination which will implement and make ef-
fective our broad codal provisions concerning those who should
respond in damages for their faults.
We reaffirm the approach used in Dixie Drive It Yourself.
and conclude that under that approach, as here demonstrated,
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.50
By the time the court reached the last of the trilogy of cases involving
similar facts and issues, Laird v. Travelers Insurance Co.,5 the duty-risk
methodology was firmly entrenched. Justice Barham authored the opin-
ion. In Laird, the plaintiff stopped his pickup truck so that it slightly
encroached upon the main travel portions of the highway. It was parked
technically in contravention of the same statute involved in both Rowe
and Pierre. Unlike the stopped vehicle involved in the Pierre case, the
vehicles in both Rowe and Laird were only in technical violation of the
statute and did not substantially obstruct the travel lane. Further, unlike
the automobile in the Pierre case, these vehicles were not unattended and
were well lighted, and the overtaking vehicles in both Rowe and Laird
which eventually collided with the stopped vehicles ignored attempts to
flag them down beforehand. While the result ultimately reached by the
court in Laird was exactly the same result reached by that court in Rowe
(indeed with the opinion written by the same Justice), the methodology
employed to achieve that result was entirely different. In short, the two
cases have the same facts, the same statute, the same Justice, and the
same result. The court outlined the order in which it would approach
the different determinations to be made in applying the duty-risk
methodology. "[W]e must determine whether his act was a cause-in-fact
of the accident, what was the nature of the duty imposed upon him, what
risks were encompassed within that duty, and whether under the com-
bination of these considerations he should be declared negligent." 2 In-
deed, the court recognized the difference in methodology employed and
even gave its reason for the switch when it made the following statement.
The facts and circumstances of this case are not analogous to,
and may be differentiated from, those of Dixie Drive It Yourself
... and Pierre. . . . The facts in this case are analogous, except
50. 257 La. at 499, 242 So. 2d at 831 (emphasis added).
51. 263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714 (1972).
52. 263 La. at 209, 267 So. 2d at 717.
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for slight differences of time, place, and such incidentals, to those
of Rowe .... This court's approach in Rowe under "proximate
cause" was different from that used in Dixie, Pierre, and [Laird],
the present case. The result in Rowe, however, would have been
the same under the approach of these cases, which we think ex-
presses more clearly, simply, and logically the rationale of the
result. This court said in Dixie: ". . . This [case reconciliation]
is rendered difficult by the ambiguity of the language of prox-
imate cause. As employed by courts, proximate cause is a legal
concept without fixed content. It is used indiscriminately to refer
to cause-in-fact, the scope of liability, and other negligence
factors." 3
It is submitted that Laird clearly signaled to both bench and bar that
the supreme court at least had made a conscious decision to abandon
the doctrine of proximate cause in favor of the duty-risk methodology.
This conclusion is supported by the earlier decision that same year by
the supreme court in Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc." Hill was signifi-
cant for a number of reasons. First, to the writer's knowledge, it was
the first case since the Dartez decision in 1965 to decide a pure tort ac-
tion utilizing the duty-risk methodology without a specific statute to supply
requisite three, a specific rule of law, to make the analysis somewhat easier.
It certainly was the first time that the Louisiana Supreme Court took
off the training wheels, so to speak, and employed this methodology to
its fullest. Indeed, the court itself recognized this difference when it pro-
nounced one of the most profound policy statements ever made by it on
this subject.
Where the rule of law upon which a plaintiff relies for impos-
ing a duty is based upon a statute, the court attempts to interpret
legislative intent as to the risk contemplated by the legal duty,
which is often a resort to the court's own judgment of the scope
of protection intended by the Legislature. . . .Where the rule
of law is jurisprudential and the court is without the aid of
legislative intent, the process of determining the risk encompassed
within the rule of law is nevertheless similar. . . .The same policy
considerations which would motivate a legislative body to impose
duties to protect from certain risks are applied by the court in
making its determination. "All rules of conduct, irrespective of
whether they are the product of a legislature or are a part of
the fabric of the court-made law of negligence, exist for purposes.
53. 263 La. at 211-12, 267 So. 2d at 718 (emphasis added; citation omitted) (quoting
Dixie Drive It Yourself, 242 La. at 494-95, 137 So. 2d at 307). The court cited Cole, Wind-
fall and Probability: A Study of "Cause" in Negligence Law, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 459 (1964);
Green, Duties, Risks Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX. L. REV. 42 (1962); Malone, supra note 10.
54. 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972).
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They are designed to protect some persons under some cir-
cumstances against some risks. Seldom does a rule protect every
victim against every risk that may befall him, merely because it
is shown that the violation of the rule played a part in producing
the injury. The task of defining the proper reach or thrust of
a rule in its policy aspects is one that must be undertaken by
the court in each case as it arises. How appropriate is the rule




Hill was a suit by a maid against her employer and a contractor for
injuries sustained when she tripped and fell over a ladder which the con-
tractor had left standing upright on the employer's premises some two
to three days earlier. When she tripped over it, the ladder was lying on
the ground. The court held that the contractor who had left the ladder
standing against the house following completion of work was under no
duty to protect the maid, who was employed by the owner of the house,
from the risk of tripping over the ladder after a third party had placed
the ladder on the ground. Therefore, the contractor's leaving the ladder
upright did not constitute negligence in the absence of evidence that it
could have reasonably been anticipated that a third person would move
the ladder and put it in the position which created the risk. The court
reached that conclusion after a classic exposition and demonstration of
how the duty-risk methodology should be applied.'5
The writer respectfully submits that if 1962 was the year that the duty-
risk methodology was introduced into the jurisprudence by Dixie Drive
It Yourself, then 1972 should be recognized as the year that it gained
ascendancy once and for all over the doctrine of proximate cause. As
can be seen from the Appendix, thereafter the tide of decisions all ran
in the direction of the duty-risk analysis.
For example, two years later the supreme court handed down Jones
v. Robbins. 7 The opinion is a tour de force by the court and an excellent
example of the methodology in action. Jones was the sort of case that
would have driven courts to distraction if they had to rummage through
its facts searching for the chimerical "proximate cause." The case is im-
portant not because of the result (which could have very easily gone the
other way, as illustrated by the dissenting opinion which arrived at a dif-
ferent conclusion using the same methodology), but because it demonstrates
the court's fluency in employing the methodology.
55. 260 La. at 549-51, 256 So. 2d at 622-23 (citations omitted) (quoting, Malone, supra
note 12, at 73).
56. At this point the writer leaves Hill. For an analysis and discussion of that impor-
tant case, see Robertson, supra note 4. With his usual insight, Professor Robertson saw
the implications of Hill early on and published on the subject.
57. 289 So. 2d 104 (La. 1974).
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In Jones, the father of a minor sued a service station owner and its
employee for injuries resulting from burns received by his child when she
ignited gasoline previously sold to her six-year-old half-sister by defen-
dant's employee. The accident occurred approximately an hour and a half
after the sale. The difficulty in the case was that the injuries occurred
not to the six-year-old but to her four-year-old half-sister at a place and
time somewhat removed from the transaction. Further complicating the
analysis was the lack of supervision of the children, even though the child's
mother was nearby watching television. The court first tackled the prob-
lem at step one of the methodology and determined that the sale of the
gasoline was a cause-in-fact of the injuries to the four-and-a-half-year-
old half-sister since, but for the defendant's furnishing the gasoline, the
accident would have never occurred. The court then proceeded to step
two and applied the duty-risk analysis to the problem. The court had
little problem determining as a general proposition that a vendor of
gasoline has a duty not to place it in the hands of those who by reason
of age or other disabilities are unaware of its special and very dangerous
propensities. The case would have been relatively easy if the six-year-old
had been injured instead of her younger and equally incompetent half-
sister, as the court recognized. "The second part of the question, and
the more serious issue, is whether or not the duty not to place gasoline
in the hands of an incompetent six year old child encompassed the risk
of harm which came to her four year old half-sister.""
In its further analysis of the problem, the court openly admitted that
the ease of association factor played a large part in its decision that the
defendant's duty was broad enough to encompass the risk to which the
plaintiff had been exposed.
The act of placing the gasoline in the hands of this incompetent
child carried with it full realization, or at least a requirement to
realize, that the conduct of the small child with the dangerous
substance involved an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Par-
ticularly included within the risk of harm to others is the fact
that, with the expectation of child group play, an easily associated
risk is that some other incompetent, by reason of tender age,
would misbehave or would misuse the gasoline.59
The court candidly identified in its reasons for judgment two of the
factors usually employed in the duty-risk analysis: type of activity (i.e.,
selling gasoline to incompetents) and ease of association. While the reader
might not agree with the emphasis placed on those factors in this deci-
sion, it is the court's acknowledgement of the factors that went into its
decision that is important. The court then concluded:
58. Id. at 107.
59. Id.
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The risk that the four year old half-sister would be injured through
the possession of the gasoline by the incompetent six year old
is exactly the kind of risk which the legal duty we have imposed
on the attendant was designed to protect against. The duty not
to place gasoline in the hands of an unsupervised incompetent
six year old was designed not only to protect that child, but also
to protect those whom she would likely expose to the danger of
the highly flammable substance."0
What is significant about the italicized portions of the opinion is that
the court did not push off its responsibility for visiting liability on the
defendant under the guise of proximate cause. Instead, the court took
the responsibility for its decision to impose liability upon the defendant
after stating the precise reasons why it did so. In short, the opinion is
not only candid but also courageous.
In 1976, the supreme court decided Shelton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. 6  The opinion is interesting not only because it employed the
methodology of duty-risk but also because it demonstrated the swiftness
with which a court can dispose of a troublesome case with proper analysis.
Defendant's mother, who had a usufruct over the defendant's property,
slipped and fell in some "goo," the residue of paint remover used on
a garage on the premises, which had collected on an adjacent footpath.
In a classic application of duty-risk methodology, the court disposed of
the cause-in-fact issue 2 as step one of the process and moved swiftly to
step two to apply the duty-risk analysis. The court concluded that the
defendant did owe a duty to the plaintiff, relying heavily on the prece-
dent factor, or prior cases imposing a duty on the landowner to discover
unreasonably dangerous conditions on the premises and to either correct
or warn of their existence. But the court then concluded that the defen-
dant had not breached the duty, inasmuch as there had been no showing
that the condition created when the paint remover was washed off the
garage was unreasonably dangerous. It is submitted, however, that the
most interesting and important thing about the Shelton case is a short
statement at the very beginning of the opinion which, to the writer's mind,
disspelled any lingering doubts concerning the installment of the duty-
risk methodology as the principal tool of tort law in Louisiana. Justice
Calogero stated:
Liability of a landowner under circumstances such as those in-
volved in the instant case is based on the concept of fault under
Article [sic] 2315 and 2316 of the Louisiana Civil Code. In order
60. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
61. 334 So. 2d 406 (La. 1976).
62. Id. at 409.
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to determine whether liability exists under the facts of a particular
case, this Court has adopted a duty-risk approach."3
By 1978, it was apparent that courts at the appellate level at least were
both familiar and comfortable with the use of the methodology. It was
at about this time that it became apparent that the courts, having adopted
the methodology and having become familiar with its workings and ap-
plication, were sure enough of themselves to test its flexibility as a tool
in disposing of issues and reaching results which would have totally con-
founded a court bound to the unwieldy methodology of proximate cause.
In Baumgartner v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.," the family
of a pedestrian killed when struck by a vehicle at a cross-walk in the
City of New Orleans sought damages from the driver's insurer. The opin-
ion makes clear that the pedestrian was guilty of contributory negligence
in that he was intoxicated at the time and that the defendant driver was
reasonable in assuming that an ordinary pedestrian in possession of his
faculties could complete the crossing timely. On that basis the lower ap-
pellate court denied the claim, but the supreme court reversed. It is ob-
vious to the writer that the court was much troubled by the lack of
mutuality of risk created by the conduct of the motorist and the pedestrian.
In other words, in a clash between a car and a pedestrian, the pedestrian
always loses. Under the old shibboleth of proximate cause the court would
have probably deceitfully distorted the facts and arrived at the conclusion
that "factually" the defendant motorist had the "last clear chance."
However, committed as it was to the methodology of duty-risk, the court
did not engage in systematic factual distortion to hide what it actually
was doing. Using the duty-risk analysis, the court concluded that the defen-
dant's duty extended to the protection of this plaintiff against his own
carelessness and that therefore contributory negligence was no defense to
the claim. It is certainly arguable that, after the passage of the comparative
negligence statute, the decision in Baumgartner might very well be dif-
ferent since the court is no longer faced with a win-or-lose proposition
but can apportion fault precisely between the parties. The whole rationale
behind Baumgartner is that the court, balancing the lack of mutuality
of risk against the fact that any amount of negligence on the part of
the plaintiff would totally destroy his claim, decided to extend the duty
of the driver to encompass that negligence. Take the factor of total destruc-
tion of the claim out of the picture, and the result could (and in the
writer's opinion should) be quite different.
In all likelihood, the decision may well have come out the same by
the employment of a doctrine of last clear chance, leaving future courts
to go through the same charade of distorting the facts in order to achieve
63. Id.
64. 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978).
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the result in a similar case. Instead, the cards are on the table for all
to see and criticize. The methodology leaves little room for subterfuge
as to what the court is up to.
Within a year of Baumgartner, two more decisions came down, Boyer
v. Johnson6" and Rue v. State,6 6 in which the court, utilizing the duty-
risk analysis, imposed a standard of care upon the defendant broad enough
to encompass what would otherwise be contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff. Boyer involved a violation of various state statutes
prohibiting the employment of a minor to drive a vehicle for commercial
purposes. In violation of those statutes, the defendant hired the plain-
tiff's decedent minor who was killed when he negligently lost control of
the van he was driving while making deliveries. Using the duty-risk analysis,
the court concluded that the statute had been designed to prohibit minors
from driving commercial vehicles in order to protect them from their own
inability, which was the precise cause of this minor's death. Therefore,
the ambit of the duty imposed by the statute upon the employer encom-
passed the risk that the minor's inability would cause him to negligently
injure or kill himself.
Similarly, in Rue the Department of Highways was found to have
negligently maintained the shoulder of one of its highways by permitting
a large rut to exist. The plaintiff negligently permitted her vehicle to leave
the traveled roadway. Doing so would have probably caused her no harm
whatsoever except that she struck the rut and her vehicle overturned.
Employing the duty-risk analysis, the supreme court reversed both lower
courts and held that the Department's duty to the traveling public en-
compassed not only those who used the shoulder to stop but also those
who inadvertently left the main travel portions of the highway and drove
onto the shoulder. While one may disagree with the decision, the
significance of all three of these decisions is that, instead of masking the
court's intentions behind a charade of fact tortuously constructed from
the evidence to fit it into one of the holes in the doctrine of proximate
cause (such as sudden emergency, momentary forgetfulness, last clear
chance, etc.), the methodology utilized by the court offered the oppor-
tunity for an honest and courageous statement of exactly why and what
the court was doing and what it intended. This result was exactly the
state of affairs envisioned by the producers of this doctrine or
methodology.
Time and space prohibit an exploration of the impact and effect of
the duty-risk methodology on the explosive development of jurisprudence
under Civil Code articles 2317 through 2322.67 That inquiry would be the
65. 360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1978).
66. 372 So. 2d 1197 (La. 1979).
67. See, e.g., Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975); Turner v. Bucher, 308
So. 2d 270 (La. 1975); Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
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appropriate subject matter for an entire article. Suffice it for the pur-
poses of this article to say that, observing the jurisprudence as it was
first handed down and then developed from the standpoint of a practi-
tioner, the writer believes that a strong case could be made for the prop-
osition that "but for" the courts' adoption of the duty-risk methodology,
they would never have been able to handle effectively the broad absolutes
of liability stated in the code articles which, if applied literally, would
spell socioeconomic disaster and result in administrative chaos for the
courts."' In the writer's opinion, the reason these articles lay dormant
for so long was precisely because the common-law doctrine of proximate
cause simply was an ineffective and inadequate tool for the utilization
and implementation of these articles. A careful analysis of this
jurisprudence will demonstrate that, with the election by the supreme court
in 1972 in the Pierre case to discard proximate cause and adopt the
methodology of duty-risk, the courts were freed from the shackles of
clothing their decisions of law with an illusion of fact under the rubric
of proximate cause. An analysis of the jurisprudence under these articles
reveals that the inherent flexibility of the methodology, coupled with the
necessary acceptance by the courts of the philosophy of judicial realism
in sculpturing their decisions, made possible and manageable the use of
these long-neglected code articles. As a happy if unintended by-product
of this development, the judiciary in Louisiana is moving closer and closer
in its day-to-day functioning to the role of judge in the true civilian
tradition.
For example, in the fairly recent case of Entrevia v. Hood,69 a
trespasser, who was injured when patently defective steps leading to an
unoccupied farm house collapsed, sued the owner of the premises seeking
imposition of liability under Civil Code articles 2317 and 2322. Literal
application of those articles would have resulted in a judgment for the
plaintiff. However, the flexibility and utility of the methodology of duty-
risk permitted the court the freedom to render a reasoned, just decision
under these articles. In the course of doing so, Justice Dennis,7" in his
usual penetrating manner, explained the role that the duty-risk methodology
played in rendering these code articles manageable and useful. Justice
Dennis also recognized the effect that the adoption of this methodology
and the consequent acceptance of the philosophy of judicial realism was
having in bringing the judiciary in this state more in line with civilian
68. For example, a literal application of article 2317, which renders a person liable
for the damages caused by things which he has in his custody, would result in absolute
liability for every automobile accident since obviously the defendant driver had the automobile
in his custody when it struck plaintiff's automobile (and vice versa)!
69. 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
70. A former student of Professor Malone and a classmate of the author.
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notions of the proper functions of a judge. In reversing the lower ap-
pellate court's decision which had imposed liability and rendering judg-
ment in favor of the defendant because the thing-the steps and the
building-did not constitute an unreasonable risk of harm, Justice Dennis
stated:
The unreasonable risk of harm criterion, however, is not a sim-
ple rule of law which may be applied mechanically to the facts
of a case. It is a concept employed by this court to symbolize
the judicial process required by the civil code. Since Articles 2317
and 2322 state general precepts and not detailed rules for all con-
crete cases, it becomes the interpreter's duty to decide which risks
are encompassed by the codal obligations from the standpoint of
justice and social utility....
Except in the clearest of cases, it is necessary for the judge,
in shaping his decision about how the law applies to the facts,
to consider the particular situation from the same standpoint as
would a legislator regulating the matter. . . .Although the judge,
unlike the legislator, is constrained by the concrete problem before
him and the ambit of his limited authority, he nevertheless must
consider the moral, social and economic values as well as the ideal
of justice in reaching an intelligent and responsible decision ...
The judicial process involved in deciding whether a risk is
unreasonable under Article 2317 is similar to that employed in
determining whether a risk is unreasonable in a traditional
negligence problem, . . .and in deciding the scope of duty or
legal cause under the duty risk analysis."
It is both interesting and important to note that Justice Dennis then
cited two giants of judicial realism, Cardozo and Green, as authority for
exactly the same proposition concerning the role and duty of judge ad-
vanced by Geny and found in the above quotation from the opinion. In
doing so, he demonstrated the congruency of the philosophy of judicial
realism as implemented by the methodology of duty-risk with civilian con-
cepts of the role of a judge in society. This vision of the judiciary's role
permitted the original redactors of the code to cast Civil Code articles
2317 and 2322 in general precepts and leave the development of the detailed
rules in concrete cases to the capable hands of the judiciary, to decide
within the constraints of the "concrete problem" before the court and
the "ambit of its limited authority" with due consideration to the "moral,
social and economic values as well as the ideal of justice in reaching an
intelligent and responsible decision.""




DUTY-RISK ANALYSIS AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL
It is the author's observation from the viewpoint of the practitioner
that, while the district courts may preach duty-risk analysis, they more
often than not practice proximate cause, particularly in jury cases. It is
not uncommon for the author to receive at pretrial conferences the court's
"general charge," the pattern of instructions usually given by that par-
ticular court in a jury case, and find contained therein definitions and
instructions regarding proximate cause.
Frankly, prior to the addition of article 1810 of the Code of Civil
Procedure by Act 699 of 1977 there was, practically speaking, no effec-
tive :procedural device readily available at the district court level to imple-
ment the duty-risk methodology, particularly in the area where it was most
needed, the jury trial." With articles 1810 and 1811 of the Code of Civil
Procedure providing the procedural tools of motions for directed verdict
and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the district bench
has at its fingertips the full panoply of procedural tools, combined with
the evolution of the substantive law, to implement the methodology of
the duty-risk analysis at the district level. While no case squarely says
that the doctrine of proximate cause is dead, the duty-risk methodology's
gradual supplanting of the doctrine of proximate cause over the past
twenty-two years, coupled with Act 534 of 1983, leads the writer to the
conclusion that today it is error to charge a jury on the doctrine of prox-
imate cause. To be more specific, in the context of jury trials (which have
become in the writer's experience more frequent in Louisiana over the
past ten years), it is error for the district court to operate under the doc-
trine of proximate cause and pass on to the jury the legal determinations
which the court should reserve for itself under the duty-risk analysis.
Prior to Act 534 of 1983, former article 1811(B) of the Code of Civil
Procedure provided that "[iun cases to recover damages for injury, death
or loss, the court shall submit to the jury special written questions." Each
question regarding fault was couched in terms of whether or not the fault
of the party in question was a "proximate cause" of the damages allegedly
sustained. By Act 534 of 1983 the legislature renominated the special ver-
dict statute as article 1812, and among other changes, deliberately expunged
the phrase "proximate cause" from the statute, substituting in every place
where it appeared the phrase "legal cause," but without a definition of
what was meant by that term.
Section 431(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "[t]he
actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if . . . his
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm." The defini-
73. For an excellent discussion of the dilemma faced by the district courts prior to
the enactment of article 1810, see 2 A. JOHNSON, LOUISIANA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 3-9
(1980).
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tion is hauntingly familiar. As noted by Professor Johnson,"4 it is the
same definition used by the supreme court in defining what is meant by
cause in fact in step one of the duty-risk methodology."
The problem is that, because of section 431(b),76 legal cause as defined
in the Restatement (Second) is merely a euphemism for proximate cause,
as noted by Professor Johnson in his excellent analysis."7 Indeed, as can
be seen from the quotations from Entrevia, the courts have on occasions
equated legal cause with the rule-making aspect of proximate cause 8 and
on other occasions have used the terms interchangeably.
It is submitted that one must look at the expurgation of the term
proximate cause in the context of the law of tort as it existed jurispruden-
tially as of the date of passage. It is hoped that this article has
demonstrated the denouement of the doctrine of proximate cause and its
replacement by duty-risk by the mid-seventies at the very latest. Given
that jurisprudential fact, there appear to be three possible conclusions con-
cerning the legislative intent in deliberately erasing the words proximate
cause from the questions to be put to the jury as trier of fact and
substituting the phrase legal cause. (1) The legislature engaged in a silly
exercise of substituting synonyms for no apparent purpose. (2) The
legislature always intended that the jury should decide all issues in the
case, both law and fact, and for that reason first used the term prox-
imate cause in Act 431 of 1979, which first introduced special verdicts.
Seeing that its will had been ignored and flaunted by the courts thereafter,
it wanted to re-enforce its position on this point (if consitutionally the
legislature could invade the province of the judiciary and take away its
interstitial law-making function at the district level); therefore the legislature
reiterated its will by substituting the Restatement (Second) euphemism for
proximate cause without comment as to its intent to repeal twenty-two
years of jurisprudence since Dixie Drive It Yourself. (3) The change was
made to eliminate the confusion the original verbiage could cause in the
minds of the district bench confronted on the one hand by the
74. 2 A. JOHNSON, supra note 73, at 50.
75. Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 263 La. 199, 210, 267 So;.2d 714, 717-18 (1972)
("[W]hether it was a substantial factor without which the accident would not have occurred-
that is, whether it had some direct relationship to the accident."); Dixie Drive It Yourself,
242 La. at 482, 137 So. 2d at 302 ("Negligent conduct is a cause-in-fact of harm to another
if it was a substantial factor in bringing about that harm."); Perkins v. Texas & N.O.
R.R., 243 La. 829, 835, 147 So. 2d 646, 648 (1962) ("Negligence is a cause in fact of
the harm to another if it was a substantial factor in bringing about that harm.").
76. Section 431(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "[t]he actor's
negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if ... there is no rule of law relieving
the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the
harm."
77. 2 A. JOHN ON, supra note 73, at 50.
78. Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146, 1149 (La. 1983).
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jurisprudence which favored the duty-risk analysis and on the other by
the statute mandating that the jury be given the question of "proximate
cause." In the writer's view, in the context of the Louisiana jurisprudence
as it stood on the date of the enactment of this statute, section 431(b)
of the Restatement (Second) was inoperative in Louisiana and had been
so for many years. However, the definition in section 431(a) of the Restate-
ment (Second) for legal cause annealed nicely with the courts' characteriza-
tion of what was a cause in fact of harm and thus was selected to replace
proximate cause. Given the proposition that all legislation must be con-
strued so as to effectuate some substantive purpose and the corollary that
there is a presumption that legislation passed was intended to have some
legal effect, it is submitted that the most reasonable and plausible inter-
pretation is number three, particularly when one realizes that the first
part of each question provided in article 1812 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure asks the jury whether or not the party from whom damages are
claimed was at fault. Only after that determination is the jury requested
to make its determination as to cause.
CONCLUSION
The Appendix contains a list of all state appellate cases since Dixie
Drive It Yourself in 1962 which employed the methodology of duty-risk.
The Appendix was compiled for a number of purposes in connection with
this article. First, as a practitioner the writer has many times heard the
complaint from colleagues whose clients' names appear to the left of "vs"
that the duty-risk methodology favors the defense because it takes away
from the jury issues which it used to decide under proximate cause. By
the same token, some of my colleagues whose clientele are listed on the
righthand side of the "vs" mutter darkly about the duty-risk methodology
being a fiendishly clever plan to permit the judiciary to subvert the "law"
and permit an ever-expanding ring of liability to surround their clients.
To both sides, the writer submits that the facts and the results simply
do not bear out either proposition. As can be seen by reference to the
Appendix, the bottom line is that the proportion of judgments which fall
on either side of "vs" is about fifty-fifty."9
79. Of course, this is a raw statistical count with no weighting for the qualitative nature
of any judgment. Criticism can no doubt be raised on the basis, for example, that under
duty risk the jury was reversed, while in the proximate cause methodology it would not
have been, or that the judgments in favor of the plaintiff represented large extensions of
liability from what previously existed. Still, the writer thought that the raw figures themselves
do point out that neither side seems to have gained a substantial advantage statistically
by the appellate courts' acceptance of the methodology. A survey of the prior 22 years
when proximate cause prevailed seemed to the writer unrepresentative, given the two dif-
ferent time spans over a score of years with resulting sociological and economic changes.
Therefore any figures derived for the prior 22 or so years would be comparing apples and
oranges, in the writer's judgment.
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A review of the cases listed in the Appendix as well as those discussed
in the body of this article has compelled the writer to the conclusion that
in the period of approximately twenty-two years since Dixie Drive It
Yourself was decided, proximate cause as the driving force behind decision-
making in the judiciary in this state has waned and died to be replaced
by the methodology of duty-risk as first postulated by Green and espoused
by Malone.
It is the observation of the writer as a practitioner that while the
district courts preach the duty-risk analysis, they ofttimes practice prox-
imate cause. This tendency of the courts at the district level to cling to
proximate cause as the modus operandi in their day-to-day dealing with
tort cases at bar on their docket stems not so much from sloth or the
crush of business at the district level but from an inherent reluctance on
the part of district judges to appear to be "making law" instead of inter-
preting it. However, as noted by Justice Dennis in Entrevia, the making
of law on a limited interstitial basis bounded by the actual facts of the
case at bar is precisely the function of a civilian judge. With the amend-
ments to the Code of Civil Procedure from 1977 to 1983, district judges
now have the full panoply of procedural tools to combine with the evolu-
tion of the substantive law to implement the duty-risk methodology at
the district level. Indeed, if the writer's conclusions are correct, district
court judges have a duty now to do so. This duty requires in the proper
use of the methodology a separation of the fact questions from those
of law, and an articulation of the reasons why the court at the district
level on first impression has concluded that the defendant did indeed owe
a duty to this particular plaintiff under these particular circumstances,
or owed no duty despite the fact that the defendant's conduct did cause
injury to the plaintiff. Then the appellate court on review can see precisely
what the district judge who was intimately involved with the case had
in mind in issuing his decision, thus making review easier (not to mention
better communication between the judges in the trenche: with those in
the tower).
The utilization of the methodology and the discharging of those duties
pose concomitant risks which have been discussed in some detail in the
course of this article, e.g., confusing cause in fact with duty and thereby
taking this pure fact determination "out of neutral," to use Green's
description of the analysis of cause in fact, and loading it with value
judgments as to policy. The court must always be wary of the gravita-
tional pull of out-of-date doctrines such as passive versus active negligence,
intervening negligence, and last clear chance. There is a risk of confusing
"ease of association" with the doctrine of "foreseeability," the latter play-
ing a large part in the question of whether or not a particular defen-
dant's conduct was substandard. As 1ointed out in the course of the arti-
cle, ease of association has a much broader accommodation and applica-
tion as one of the factors in determining whether there was a legal duty
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to begin with. In short, there is a risk of employing twenty-twenty hind-
sight in making the determination whether this particular plaintiff's in-
juries were "easily associated with" the conduct of the defendant under
scrutiny. There is a risk in this analysis of allowing the socioeconomic
factor to degenerate into a synonym for the "deep pocket" theory of
liability as between the parties in determining who should pay, without
regard to the broader social and economic consequences that would flow
from such a decision when applied in the future. Last but not least is
the risk of not being able to find enough men and women with the judicial
courage and intellectual integrity to man the benches of this state, rendering
decisions by this methodology without fear or favor according to their
best judgment as to what is ultimately "just," and then courageously giving
the real reasons why one side or the other must accept a loss ofttimes
running into thousands and hundred of thousands of dollars (an explana-
tion owed to the loser out of consideration of civilized behavior and
decency if not a simple notion of justice).
The question then becomes whether the duty of employing the duty-
risk methodology is worth the risks discussed in this article. Or, to put
it another way, is the game worth the candle?80 In answer, the writer
can not hope to improve upon the following observation made by Pro-
fessor Green.
The method of analysis developed in the foregoing pages does
not purport to make the deciding of cases automatic or even easy.
Its only purpose is to make the process rational-
understandable-to strip it of hocus-pocus-to free our legal
thought from the slavery of mocking phrases which defy analysis
because they are empty. To know our problem is half the battle.
To locate the points of weakness in a case is a step just short
of its solution.'
It is submitted that any methodology which imposes upon the law-giver
duties which, if met, generate the light of reason and understanding and
spread it over the legal affairs of men is worth whatever risks that must
be run to achieve that purpose. If it fails to do so, then to paraphrase
Cassius's famous statement to Brutus, the fault, dear reader, lies not in
the methodology nor even in the stars, but in ourselves.
80. 'Professor Malone once remarked to the writer, perhaps facetiously, that Dean Prosser
and he had concluded after a summer of discussion that all of tort law could be boiled
down to this one juridical question.
81. :L. GREEN, supra note 1, at 199.
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APPENDIX
[Editor's note: The search for cases discussing proximate cause and duty-
risk covered the time period between January 15, 1962 and March 8, 1984.
The cases in this appendix employed duty risk and proximate cause
methodologies, as indicated. However, it is left to the reader to deter-
mine the significance of causation issues to the outcome in each case.
The subsequent history of the reported cases is not given.]
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1. Brown v. White, 430 So. 2d
16 (La. 1983)
2. Carter v. City Parish Gov't.,
423 So. 2d 1080 (La. 1982)
3. Sanders v. Hercules Sheet Metal,
Inc., 385 So. 2d 772 (La. 1980)
4. Rue v. State, 372 So. 2d 1197
(La. 1979)
5. Thrasher v. Leggett, 373 So. 2d
494 (La. 1979)
6. Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164
(La. 1978)
7. Gonzales v. Winn-Dixie La.,
326 So. 2d 486 (La. 1976)
8. Green v. Taca Int'l Airlines,
304 So. 2d 357 (La. 1974)
9. Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
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Cases
5. Jacoby v.,State, 434 So. 2d 570
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1983)
6. Williams v. City of New Orleans,
433 So. 2d 1129 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983)
7. Dusenbery v. McMoran Exploration Co.,
433 So. 2d 268 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1983)
8. Brock v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
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Dev., 428 So. 2d 1251 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983)
12. Palmer v. Bartley, Inc., 430 So. 2d 118
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1983)
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So. 2d 1035 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983)
15. Garcia v. Jennings, 427 So. 2d 1329
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1983)
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New Orleans, 426 So. 2d 1385 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1982)
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(La. App. 1st Cir. 1982)
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Hoerner, 426 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1982)
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368 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982)
22. Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., 415 So. 2d
1019 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982)
23. Daniel v. St. Frances Cabrini Hosp.,
415 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982)
24. Charles v. Lavergne, 412 So. 2d 726
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1982)
25. Tilley v. Mt. Vernon Ins. Co., 411
So. 2d 72 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982)
26. Head v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
408 So. 2d 1174 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982)
27. Foster v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 407
So. 2d 759 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982)
28. Robillard v. P & R Race Tracks, 405
So. 2d 1203 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981)
29. Oliver v. Capitino, 405 So. 2d 1102
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30. West v. United States Fidelty & Guar. Co.,
405 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981)
31. Nelson v. Powers, 402 So. 2d 129 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1981)
32. Truluck v. Clark, 401 So. 2d 1236 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1981)
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399 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981)
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44. Brandon v. State, 367 So. 2d 137 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1979)
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